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‘It’s not me, it’s the corporation’: the value of corporate accountability in the global 
political economy 
 
Grietje Baars* 
 
‘Corporate accountability’ legitimises and thus reinforces the 
current system of surplus value extraction. Accountability struggles 
effectively to reduce corporate capitalism’s violence to the good 
corporate citizen’s occasional ‘wrongdoing’, which becomes a 
calculable risk capable of being exchanged—signifying ‘planned 
impunity’. Corporate accountability, though a seemingly 
emancipatory process, thus exemplifies law’s constitutive role in 
capitalism and the need to move beyond law for emancipation. 
 
We’re sorry. It’s not us. It’s the monster. The bank isn’t like a man. 
Yes, but the bank is only made of men. 
No, you’re wrong there—quite wrong there. The bank is something else than men. It 
happens that every man in a bank hates what the bank does, and yet the bank does it. 
The bank is something more than men, I tell you. It’s the monster. Men made it, but they 
can’t control it.1 
 
The first question is that whenever there is a question of power there is a question of 
legitimacy. As things stand now, these instrumentalities of tremendous power 
[corporations] have the slenderest claim of legitimacy. This is probably a transitory 
period. They must find some claim of legitimacy, which also means finding a field of 
responsibility and a field of accountability. Legitimacy, responsibility and accountability 
are essential to any power system if it is to endure. They correspond to a deep human 
instinct.2  
 
 
For as long as ‘the corporation’ has existed, it has had to fight for its reputation.3 Variously called, 
a ‘worm[s] in the entrails of men’, a Frankensteinian monster, or a psychopath, the suspicion has 
long persisted that there is something fishy about this odd, ungraspable, ‘artificial entity’ called 
‘the corporation’. While often, reputational wounds attach only to specific corporations and are 
healed through a locally-applied remedy, or by corporate atonement  sometimes the challenge 
extends beyond the individual corporation to the concept of the corporation per se and to all 
corporations or to ‘corporate capitalism’ as a whole. The 1720 scandal of the South Sea bubble, for 
example, was linked to the very concept of the corporation, which was called into question as a 
result, but left intact nonetheless. At other moments, particular corporations have become a 
symbolic target for a political movement because of their perceived power or privilege. This was 
the case with the British East India Company—which received preferential tax treatment by the 
British over rival American companies—leading to the Boston Tea Party and kicking off the 
American Revolution. ‘Misuse’ of the corporate form has shown the public what a powerful and 
                                                 
* Lecturer, The City Law School, City University London. Email: grietje.baars.1@city.ac.uk. Tomaso Ferrando, 
Vanja Hamzič, Rob Knox, Hannah Franzki, Ronen Shamir and two anonymous reviewers provided insightful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
1 J Steinbeck, Grapes of Wrath (Viking Press, 1939) 43. 
2 A Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society: A Preliminary Discussion of the Corporation (Fund for the 
Republic, 1957) 16. 
3 See, e.g., K Yamamoto, ‘Early Modern Business Projects and a Forgotten History of Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, in G Baars & A Spicer (eds), The Corporation (Cambridge UP, forthcoming); J Taylor, Creating 
Capitalism: Joint Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture, 1800-1870 (Boydell, 2006). 
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malevolent tool the corporation can be. In the nineteenth century, abuses by the International Congo 
Society, owned by King Leopold and responsible for the deaths of millions, led to the growth of 
the abolitionist movement in Europe, which deflected criticism the corporation.4 Instances of 
corporations employed as instruments of foreign policy, in the so-called ‘banana wars’5 and in the 
Pinochet takeover of Chile, have only recently been written into history.6 More complex 
entanglements of corporations in political-economic historical events such as the 1920s crisis,7 the 
involvement of zaibatsu and the German cartels in Japanese and Nazi imperialism, which at the 
time led to a temporary clampdown on vanquished industrial power as well as the prosecution of 
company directors and officers, and a swift (if messy) restoration once the political landscape 
changed.8 
 
Despite –or I suggest because of – these periodic backlashes, the structure of the corporation has 
not only survived but continues to thrive. Apart from the German company directors prosecuted at 
Nuremberg, who got off with ‘sentences light enough to please a chicken thief’ before several of 
them resumed their prior positions,9 the individual people who owned and/or ran corporations have 
remained largely immune. The interests (and indeed often the identity and class membership) of 
capitalist and governmental elites – though at times at odds or in competition with each other, in 
fact largely coincide and it is this dynamic that has driven the legal-economic development of the 
corporation. The Anglo-Saxon model of the corporation with its key characteristics of separate 
legal personality, limited liability, indefinite lifespan, and profit mandate, has been adopted (or 
imposed) around the world. Over its three century-history, the corporation has become the key 
apparatus that facilitates the surplus value-extracting function of global capitalism. This has been 
due to the parallel development of the ‘corporate form’ and a specific ‘corporate ideology’ –an 
ideology which is in constant flux and constantly under (re)construction. This essay—which forms 
part of a growing corpus of work employing the commodity form theory of law10—focuses on the 
development and ‘value’ of this corporate ideology as it holds up the corporate form, and seeks to 
find the cracks in their seemingly unbreakable bond, in which the ‘seed of the new’ may germinate.  
 
The latest series of backlashes against multinational corporations appears stronger than before. The 
current debates centre, at one end of the spectrum, on ‘corporate wrongdoing’ or the ‘excesses of 
capitalism’ that proper regulation can minimise and, at the other end, on the fundamental 
contradictions between corporate capitalism, and the global ecosystem and world peace. The ultra-
left’s anti-corporate sentiment, which has built up within and alongside the anti-globalisation 
movement, is starting to filter through to a broader public. This is fuelled by an increasing 
scepticism over whether regulation will or can be created and enforced so as to ‘restrain’ 
capitalism. Unhappiness about individual corporations’ wrongdoing is only increased when it is 
found that even popular corporations such as Apple and Amazon avoid tax and maintain abusive 
working conditions.11 Privatisation, too, is starting to attract negative attention. Broader sections 
of the public have become suspicious of private contractors such as Blackwater (now Xe), Veolia 
                                                 
4 D Renton, D Seddon & L Zeilig, The Congo: Plunder and Resistance (Zed Books, 2006). 
5 D Litvin, Empires of Profit: Commerce, Conquest and Corporate Responsibility (Thomson, 2004). 
6 N Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Allen Lane, 2007). 
7 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press, 2002). 
8 G Baars, ‘Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? The hidden story of the prosecution of industrialists post-WWII’, in G 
Simpson & K Heller (eds), Untold Stories: Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials (Oxford UP, 2013) 163-92. 
9 Ibid. 
10 This theory holds that law, by virtue of its very form, approximates the commodity form, and views law as a sine 
qua non of capitalism. The corpus includes, e.g., E Pashukanis, Law & Marxism: A General Theory (Ink Links, 
1978); C Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Pluto, 2005); R Knox, ‘Marxism, 
International Law and Political Strategy’, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009) 413; R Knox in this issue. 
11 ‘EU Tax: Tough love for multinationals’ sweetheart deals’, Financial Times, 13 July 2015, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/32e6a5c4-1a80-11e5-a130-2e7db721f996.html#axzz3n1j1vTkE (last visited 21 
December 2015). 
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and G4S, people understand some wars to be fought for corporate profit, and the US ‘prison-
industrial complex’ (in the UK, privately run immigration detention) is receiving wider 
condemnation.12 Bigger questions are being asked—by a so far small but vocal number of activist-
critics —about the desirability and ultimate sustainability of corporate capitalism per se. 
Respectable ‘centrist’ activists in the US have challenged corporate campaign funding, as well as 
the right of corporations to refuse employees (elements of) medical insurance on religious 
grounds.13 When Volkswagen (a ‘trustworthy’ company) was said to have been cheating 
environmentally-conscious consumers, this troubled a significant section of the western middle 
class.14 The increasing distrust of large corporations has led to the growth of ‘buy local’ and ‘small, 
independent’, fair trade and organic ‘locally grown’ movements.15 At the same time, it has also 
triggered ‘legitimacy recovery’ efforts on the part of corporate capitalism.  
 
In this essay I take these legitimacy backlashes, seriously. My specific focus is the emergence of 
the debate on ‘corporate accountability’ (CA). Today the call to ‘hold corporations to account’ as 
an answer to the latest corporate backlash is heard far and wide.16 CA is generally understood to 
mean the efforts to force corporations to account for (explain, justify, excuse, compensate, make 
good) the negative effects of corporate activity on its ‘victims’ and the public at large. The methods 
employed for this include both ‘self-accounting’, through or with the help of various NGOs, 
lawyers, media, activists, states and international bodies, corporate-produced corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) programmes, drawing up voluntary guidelines, standards, creating schemes 
for compliance, monitoring or (self-) certification, working with PR and the media on corporate 
image, etc. It also includes the work of states and courts in legally regulating, permitting self-
regulation, prosecuting or threatening to prosecute, subjecting to licensing and other bureaucratic 
procedures, and a variety of actors in advocating and lobbying for or participating in negotiations 
around CA instruments and policies. CA in this sense is thought of as a vital method of restraining 
corporate activity, limiting wrongdoing and reducing negative effects of corporate profit-making 
activities.  
 
I propose here that corporate accountability also has a second, closely related but more (or 
increasingly less) hidden meaning. This meaning is based on Weber’s literal understanding of 
‘accountability’ – the ability to account the cost/benefit effects of certain events and processes. The 
exact value of CA work in the ordinary sense can be calculated (think: money spent on CSR 
consultants, CSR projects and gestures, fees for certification, advertising and PR, lobbying, legal 
fees defending CA cases or indeed spying on and suing anti-corporate activists,17 etc. and the 
effects on company share prices, brand value, and goodwill as a result18). My key argument here 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., the work of CorporateWatch in the UK, available at https://corporatewatch.org (last visited 11 November 
2015). 
13 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, Supreme Court No. 08-205, 21 January 2010; Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. ___ (2014). 
14 R Hotten, ‘Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained’, BBC, 15 December 2015, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34324772 (last visited 25 December 2015). 
15 See, e.g., projects like Growing Communities in London, available at http://www.growingcommunities.org (last 
visited 4 January 2016); UK Food Sovereignty Network, available at http://foodsovereigntynow.org.uk (last visited 4 
January 2016); the People’s Grocery in Oakland, California, available http://www.peoplesgrocery.org (last visited 4 
January 2016) and studies such as ‘People Powered Money: Designing, developing and delivering community 
currencies’, New Economics Foundation, 18 May 2015, available at 
http://www.neweconomics.org/publications/entry/people-powered-money (last visited 4 January 2016). 
16 E.g. the work on accountability of the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, at http://business-
humanrights.org/en/corporate-legal-accountability (last accessed 4/1/15). 
17 J Scahill, ‘Blackwater’s Black Ops’, The Nation, 15 September 2010, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/blackwaters-black-ops/ (last visited 11/11/2015). 
18 Indeed, “[a] 2013 study of 1000 brands found that 28% of brand value relates to corporate social responsibility,” G 
LeBaron and J Lister, ‘Ethical Audits and the Supply Chains of Global Corporations’ SPERI Global Political 
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is that rather than thinking of CA as restraining corporate value extracting activity, we should think 
of it as facilitating corporate profit making and corporate capitalism as a whole. Corporate 
reputational risk becomes calculable through the ability to account – to predict, know, and thus 
manage, manipulate, exchange or ‘bank on’, future events, relations, dynamics, through 
‘investment’ in CA efforts, which has (adds) value in itself.  Secondly and most significantly, CA 
work, in shaping how we think of, feel about, deal with, and what we expect from, the corporation, 
has a legitimising effect-the value of which to the corporation and corporate capitalism more 
generally is not directly calculable, it is ‘priceless’.  
 
In the first section of this article I describe how the corporation was created as a legal structure to 
function as the surplus-value extracting motor of capitalism. I comment on its main elements and 
the main movements in its creation, the notion of corporate legal personality, limited liability, the 
profit mandate. As the corporation is created as an ‘amoral calculator’ and ‘externalising machine’, 
its growing power and what we now call ‘negative externalities’ are inevitably challenged, and the 
question arises, “why do we put up with it all”?19 The answer lies in the creation of corporate 
ideology legitimising this structure. I discuss the latter in the second section, corporate ideology 
production predominantly through CA in the form of corporate self-portrayal as a good and 
‘socially responsible’ citizen. I discuss CSR’s material and intellectual provenance and its 
development into a movement for the promotion of non-binding rules on corporate behaviour.  
 
The subsequent development is that of CA ‘cause lawyering’ and the multiple attempts by NGOs 
and ‘cause-lawyers’ to ‘hold corporations to account’ in western domestic courts.20 Such cause 
lawyering forms a civil society response to the CSR movement, which in turn has ramped up its 
game to alleviate the ‘bad corporation’ accusations of the cause lawyers.21 This dynamic then 
produces the call for the legalisation of CSR, which seeks to form a compromise between the first 
two responses and has advocates in the corporate, NGO/practice world as well as in academia.22 
One particular demand often expressed within the ‘legalised CSR’ ambit is the inclusion of 
corporate criminal liability in international law or, the formation of a specific field of ‘corporate 
international criminal law’.  
 
Building on my argument that corporate accountability should be seen as (value-producing) 
accountability in the literal, Weberian sense, in the final section I underscore the distributive effects 
of the CA tools created within these three strategies. Most importantly, the contribution CA makes 
to the reification/anthropomorphisation of the corporation changes (‘spirits away’23) the 
relationship of responsibility for harm from individual to affected communities or society at large, 
to one of individual victims with ‘the corporation’. The practical effect of this is that individuals 
affected by the particular excesses of capitalism (normally in the Global South), are constituted as 
victims who, in a legal relationship as formal equals with the corporation, can seek to negotiate the 
                                                 
Economy Brief No. 1 (2016) 6, available at http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Global-Brief-1-
Ethical-Audits-and-the-Supply-Chains-of-Global-Corporations.pdf (last visited 19/01/16). 
19 I take this evocative phrase from P Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State (Cambridge 
UP, 2002) 400. 
20 See e.g. Amnesty Dignity Report: Amnesty International: Demand Dignity: Close the accountability gap: 
Corporations, human rights and poverty (2009) available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT35/006/2009/en (last visited 11/11/15); Global Witness and Sherpa, 
Report: Bankrolling Brutality - Why European timber company DLH should be held to account for profiting from 
Liberian conflict timber (2009), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/bankrolling-brutality-why-
european-timber-company-dlh-should-be-held-account-profiting (last visited 11/11/15). 
21 R Shamir, ‘Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate 
Social Responsibility’, 38 Law and Society Review (2004) 635.  
22 E.g. the various contributions in D McBarnet, et al (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge UP, 2007).  
23 C Arthur, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in E Pashukanis, Law & Marxism: A General Theory (Ink Links, 1978) 31. 
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‘price’ of the harm done to them, under the commodified responsibility relationship, where 
‘planned impunity’24 thus furthers contemporary imperialism. ‘Calculable’ value is created in the 
specific internal mechanism of CA, namely that of channelling difficult to predict risk to business 
(the potential repercussions of suffering produced by capitalism) into calculable avenues of 
exchange between the corporation and individual victims. Finally, and importantly, the broader 
effect of the availability of accountability mechanisms (whether used or not) is that of absorbing a 
large chunk of critique of capitalism and grassroots anticapitalist resistance into a struggle where 
capitalism’s violence is reduced to ‘corporate wrongdoing’ and where, once accountability 
mechanisms exist, the backlash is reversed and the corporation and thus capitalism are ‘fixed’.25 
CSR, corporate cause lawyering, and advocacy towards a ‘corporate international criminal law 
(ICL)’ – together ‘corporate accountability’ - form the main part of what Klein has called, “the 50 
year campaign for total corporate liberation.”26 In particular, (putative) corporate ICL would serve 
to complete the corporation as a political citizen and legitimate participant in global governance. 
The greatest value of CA is that it (albeit always only temporarily) legitimises and therefore 
perpetuates and even strengthens the current system of surplus value extraction, enabling, or 
continuing to enable, imperialist accumulation, white male heterosexual hegemony, and 
exploitation of the working class both at home and abroad.27  
 
CA thus serves as an illustration of the commodity form theory of law’s central claim regarding 
law’s emancipatory potential. CA shows how capitalist law generates seemingly emancipatory 
discourses and practices that, on closer inspection, turn out to follow the logic of capitalism itself. 
In my final section I also briefly consider alternatives, which must entail a move beyond law. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE AS 
THE MOTOR OF CAPITALISM 
 
While up to the mid 20th century the genealogy of the corporate form was a common topic of 
conversation among lawyers and scholars,28 it has now been written out of the main company law 
textbooks, leaving the corporation as an unquestioned ‘natural’ fact of life.29 A second look at the 
material/social origins of this concept or ‘technology of law’ is, however, illuminating when 
considering the value of corporate accountability. The creation of the corporate form with its now-
common elements also necessitated the creation of a corporate ideology, which facilitated the 
almost ubiquitous acceptance of the British/US model as the main legal form for business. 
Corporate ideology creates a narrative for the acceptance of the personification of capital as the 
main means through which humans are treated as commodities and surplus value is extracted–
‘Monsieur le Capital’ driving the corporate vehicle as the motor of capitalism.30 
                                                 
24 I base this term on ‘planned misery’ as put forward by Susan Marks in S Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’, 
74 Modern Law Review (2011) 57. 
25 Aside from imperialist wars etc. but perhaps an argument can be made that these are placed outside of capitalism 
in the public imaginary. 
26 N Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Allen Lane, 2007) 19. In Shock Doctrine, Klein 
describes this process as represented in the economic reforms including privatisations and corporate involvement in 
i.a. occupied Iraq and post-Katrina New Orleans. 
27 Cf. J Suárez-Krabbe, in N Dhawan (ed.) ‘The Other Side of the Story: Human Rights from a Historical 
Transatlantic Perspective’, in Decolonizing Enlightenment: Transnational Justice, Human Rights and Democracy in 
a Postcolonial World (Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2014) 211-226. 
28 See, e.g., J Dewey, ‘The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality’ 35 The Yale Law Journal (1926) 
655; D James ‘Frankenstein, Incorporated, by I. Maurice Wormser’ 7 Indiana Law Journal (1931) 197.  
29 G Baars, The Corporation, Law & Capitalism (Brill, forthcoming); P Ireland, I Grigg-Spall & D Kelly, ‘The 
Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law’ 14 Journal of Legal Studies (1987) 163. 
30 M Neocleous, ‘Staging Power: Marx, Hobbes and the Personification of Capital’ 14 Law and Critique (2003) 147. 
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The modern corporation originates in the transition to capitalism and the creation of market society 
in Europe, at a time when capitalism reorganised the provision of everyday wants and labour power 
was commodified. In its earliest mystical conception, the corporate concept was employed for the 
personification of a certain type of power, and for the organisation of responsibility. From 
incorporated boroughs and guilds through to the famous Case of Sutton’s Hospital,31 the concept 
was then developed in the English courts in response to the expansionary demands of the capitalist 
and the emerging entrepreneurial middle classes.32  
 
Weber’s concept of rational accounting enables us to understand the relation between law, business 
and responsibility. For capitalism to function, accountability was needed, meaning that an 
entrepreneur had to be able to predict and calculate the value of every element of his business, 
including opportunity and risk, and including the cost of averting such risk. Double-entry 
bookkeeping enabled accountability, and the ability to see (and to some extent decide) which 
profits or losses could be ascribed to whom, and, importantly, which risk/cost could be externalized 
to broader society and the environment. Weber explains how rational commerce (i.e. capitalist 
exchange) was the field where ‘quantitative reckoning’ first appeared. For as long as business was 
carried out by family firms, as a ‘closed family affair’, ‘accountability was . . . unnecessary’;33 but 
in the transition to capitalism it became essential. The development of what Weber calls ‘calculable 
law’ facilitated this accountability in the literal sense: ‘[t]he capitalistic form of industrial 
organization, if it is to operate rationally, must be able to depend on calculable adjudication and 
administration.’34 Family, community and eventually also individual property became separated 
from each other and from the property of the business, mediated by legal (exchange) relations or 
the ‘cash nexus’. 
 
From an arrangement based on blood and trust, we gradually move to a formal legal relationship 
called a ‘Trust’ (or indeed a Partnership or Corporation). Calculable law allows the business unit 
to base its decisions not on moral considerations, but on economic rationality. Responsibility 
becomes accountability when responsibility becomes a commodified concept capable of being 
assigned a value (and therefore of being exchanged). The corporation becomes an ‘amoral 
calculator’35 and the corporate construct allows/forces its human operators to be the same. Here we 
see the genealogy of the notion of accountability in this literal sense at the core of the early legal 
form of the corporation. 
 
Bringing in outside capital, and consequently opening up a public market for company shares was 
the next big development for the legal concept of the corporation. One of the best known of the 
early corporations was the British East India Company (BEI Co), which raised money from the 
general public, thus socialising the risk of a potentially disastrous venture. At the same time, the 
BEI Co and companies like it, functioned as a vehicle for the global spread of capitalist law and 
was part of what enabled the metropole’s capitalists’ primitive accumulation, the slave trade and 
the subjection of three quarters of the world to Western European capitalist interest. Share trade 
became very popular, and the public literally ‘bought into’ capitalism enthusiastically. When the 
share craze around the South Sea Company and others led to a spectacular burst, revealing a web 
of deceit and corruption involving members of the Government and Royal Household, the 1720 
Bubble Act (which, amongst other things, restricted public incorporation but was rumoured to have 
been put forward by South Sea company directors to root out competition) did not stem this 
                                                 
31 Case of Sutton’s Hospital [1612] 77 Eng Rep 960, 973. 
32 This section is based on chapter 2 of Baars (forthcoming). 
33 M Weber, General Economic History (Transaction Books, 1982) 225. 
34 Ibid 277. 
35 E Sutherland, White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version (Yale UP, 1983) 236. 
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enthusiasm.36 Lawyers created Joint Stock Company equivalents through contract—‘deed of 
settlement’ companies, and stockjobbers proliferated, setting up street stalls selling penny shares 
in companies for ‘importing jackasses from Spain’, ‘securing perpetual motion’, or ‘an undertaking 
which would in due time be revealed’.37 Their trade, in the face of healthy scepticism towards such 
projects, and doubts about joint-stock companies’ ability to act morally,38 can be seen as testament 
to the growing strength and popular acceptance of corporate ideology developing already at this 
point. Projectors (as those designing such companies for investment were known) feigned public 
interest39 and at the same time public ownership of corporations meant that ‘everyone’ was 
interested in the corporation’s thriving. ‘Social capital’ thus conversely makes the enterprise appear 
as a ‘social enterprise’.40   
 
The South Sea bubble share-craze had, by advancing links between the various financial markets 
in Western Europe, ‘facilitated, for the first time, the emergence of an integrated and efficient 
international financial market’.41 This development led to the courts reconceptualising the 
company share no longer as a share in the actual assets of the corporation, but a financial interest 
in company profits (and a return on winding up), and shareholders not as partners or lenders but as 
pure money capitalists, as ‘investors’.42 This supported the idea that shareholders were divorced 
from the actual goings-on in a company—not liable for, nor indeed perhaps interested in, actions 
of the company beyond the maximum effective extraction of surplus value. This move contributes 
to the corporation’s nature as an ‘amoral calculator’. 
 
The first modern companies act, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 properly adopted the deed 
of settlements company, endowing it with all the key characteristics of the corporation except 
limited liability. The Act included a provision affirming the pursuit of profit as the proper purpose 
of the corporation, as well as a right of incorporation (rather than a privilege bestowed by the 
Crown).43 Limited liability had been accepted by the courts and was subsequently provided for by 
statute in 1855.44 Both the legal nature of the share and limited liability then ‘personified’ the 
company as a separate legal entity from the shareholders, a new legal subject, ‘capital 
personified’.45 Between 1856 and 1862 statutory wording changed, almost unnoticed, from ‘men 
creating themselves into a company’ to ‘men creating a company’.46 This, as well as the ‘finishing 
touch’ of company law which allowed a hands-on managing owner and not just an arms length 
investor to shift the risk of their enterprise away from themselves through limited liability in 
Salomon v Salomon, evidences the power of the idea of the corporation.47 This ‘Frankensteinian 
monster’ eventually came to dominate the very society that created it.48  
 
                                                 
36 J Farrar & B Hannigan (eds), Farrar’s Company Law (Butterworths, 1998) 18; P Davies, Gower and Davies: The 
Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 26. 
37 M Wormser, Frankenstein Incorporated (McGraw-Hill, 1931) 21. 
38 Taylor (2006) 23. 
39 Yamamoto (2016). 
40 In the sense that it receives capital from society rather than operating on private capital. K Marx, Capital: Critique 
of Political Economy, vol. 3 (Penguin Classics, 1981) 567. Space does not allow for much nuance in the treatment of 
corporate ideology here; for a book-length treatment of popular attitudes to the corporation, see Taylor (2006). 
41 Harris (2000) 80. 
42 P Ireland, ‘Finance and the Origins of Modern Company Law’, in Baars & Spicer (eds) (forthcoming). Harris 
suggests that ‘reconceptualising’ may be overstating the courts’ actions, since they up to that point had mostly 
avoided considering what the legal nature of the share was. Harris (2000) 118. 
43 S.II Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c.110. 
44 Limited Liability Act, 18 & 19 Vict., c.133. 
45 Neocleous (2003) 158. 
46 Ireland et al. (1987); P Ireland, ‘Capitalism Without the Capitalist’ 17 Journal of Legal History (1996) 41.  
47 Salomon v A. Salomon and Co. Ltd [1897] AC 22; Ireland (2016).  
48 Wormser (1931); Neocleous (2013). 
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‘Limited’ liability in fact shifted liability (or the financial cost of ‘failure’) to unsecured creditors, 
who, in turn, were able to rely on their own liability being limited, and who also started to gain 
protection through the development of insolvency laws. Ultimately, the liability (cost) beyond the 
limit is socialised over broader society and the natural environment. This, and the socialisation of 
shareholding as a factor in the legitimisation of the narrow profit mandate (‘shareholder 
primacy’49), serves to render the corporation a ‘structure of irresponsibility’,50 which is ‘capitalism 
congealed’ or ‘capital personified’ and which serves to conceal (and, of course, enrich) the 
individual businessperson and remove the investor to an arms-length distance. In the 20th and 21st 
centuries we have seen corporate groups form even more sophisticated structures (multinational 
corporate groups, enmeshed in global value chains) that can isolate and shift value, risk and 
responsibility on the global level while continuing global accumulation of wealth and the 
exploitation of Third World labour much like its joint stock forbearer.  
 
In sum, the creation of the legal construct of the modern corporation replaced the forms of 
communal burden-sharing of the pre-industrial economy during the transition to capitalism, and 
enabled the accumulation of wealth by the rising middle class and consequently the industrial 
revolution. As such, it formed an integral part of the creation of the modern capitalist system in 
existence today. The formal legal concept of the corporation with separate legal personality was 
created in order to exclude as much as possible the individual as a legally relevant agent in a 
specific context, to externalize individuals’ responsibility by hiving off risk and displacing 
potential liability, and to render ‘accountable’ (calculable and plausible) and exchangeable that 
which is not externalized. This construction makes the corporation capitalism’s main motor.51  
 
The corporate form, the company as an ‘amoral calculator’52 induces its individual operatives to 
make ‘economically rational’, arms’ length, amoral decisions—a form of capitalist anomie.53 The 
fact that the corporation’s history is now rarely discussed, its characteristics rarely questioned, that 
it is seen as given, precisely maintains this anomie. The modern corporation as ‘the end of history’ 
in economic organisation54 continues to produce knowledge, policy and legal decisions and 
instruments, that self-perpetuate capitalism and reproduce current socio-economic hierarchies. This 
ideological achievement is the key source of corporate power. Maintaining this power in the face 
of intermittent attack, did, however, mean that the corporation, as the reification of capital, 
‘Monsieur le Capital’, the corporate ‘psychopath’55 would require some humanisation.56  
 
                                                 
49 D French, S Mayson & C Ryan, Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law (Oxford UP, 2009) 31-32. 
50 D Whyte (ed.), Crimes of the Powerful: A Reader (Open UP, 2008) 104. 
51 H Glasbeek, ‘The Corporation as legally constructed site of irresponsibility’, in H Pontell & G Geis, The 
International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime (Springer, 2010) 249. It is not my aim here to provide 
a detailed account of the various instruments proposed and adopted, the roles of the various ‘players’, the 
corporations, platforms, coalitions, projects, foundations and institutions, the standards, decisions, principles, 
guidelines, best practices, pledges, compacts, handbooks and compliance measuring tools of CSR. That has been 
done elsewhere: see, e.g., J Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (Cambridge UP, 2006); D 
McBarnet, ‘Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: The new corporate accountability’, in 
McBarnet et al. (eds) (2007) 9. 
52 Sutherland (1983) 236-38, arguing the corporation comes closer to ‘economic man’ than any person or 
organization. 
53 N Passas, ‘Anomie and Corporate Crime’ 14 Contemporary Crises (1990) 157 excerpted in Whyte (ed.) (2008) 
153, 155. 
54 P Ireland, ‘History, Critical Legal Studies and the Mysterious Disappearance of Capitalism’ 65 The Modern Law 
Review (2002) 120. 
55 J Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (Robinson Publishing, 2005) 134. 
56 Coca Cola, ‘Is it true that Santa traditionally wears red because of Coca-Cola?’, available at https://www.coca-
colaanswers.co.uk/en/qtile.html/rumours/is-it-true-that-santa-traditionally-wear-red-because-of-coca-coal/ (last 
visited 1 November 2015). See also R Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and 
Corporate Imagery in American Big Business (University of California Press, 2001). 
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THE CREATION OF THE CORPORATE SOUL: CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS THE ‘LAST MAGINOT LINE OF 
CAPITALISM’ 
 
Glasbeek has called CSR the ‘last maginot line of capitalism’, which it has ‘dug’ in the face of the 
latest remaining resistance to its main bearer, the corporation.57 The first resistance to the 
corporation, as discussed above, was overcome through reification, normalisation, and buy-in to 
corporate capitalism, and in the 20th century, corporate ideology continued to develop as part of 
capitalist ideology more generally. The humanisation of ‘Monsieur le Capital’, corporate 
citizenship, the CSR industry and corporate legal accountability are corporate ideology tools 
created in response to backlashes against the legitimacy of the corporate form and profit-making 
activities. In Europe and the US, the growing power of large monopoly corporations and cartels 
caused public concern in the first two decades of the 20th century while the depression of the 1930s 
caused another backlash this time against the system of free enterprise itself. 19th-century 
reification then had to be followed by the creation of the corporate soul, to portray the corporation 
as a ‘good citizen’– ‘institution in the service of mankind’ rather than ‘amoral calculator’.58 In 
1908, the US telecommunications giant AT&T was one of the first to launch an advertising 
campaign aimed at getting the public to ‘love and hold affection for’ the corporation. US historian 
Roland Marchand has evocatively described how corporate ideology was re-constructed when the 
major US corporations used advertising and later in-house public relations officers and even iconic 
architecture, to portray themselves as benevolent and socially responsible.59 Moreover, in the 
1930s, crisis corporations started to address the public as voters rather than ‘just’ buyers, 
positioning themselves alongside the state as benevolent providers of public goods in what was the 
‘best strategy . . . to restore people’s faith in corporations and reverse their growing fascination 
with big government’.60 A parallel development to the creation of the corporate soul is the 
pinpointing of a ‘body to kick’ and emerging ideas around corporate crime in the first half of the 
20th century.61 The ‘obvious’ involvement of the major German corporations in the WWII effort 
had led to the prosecution of a number of individual German company directors but not the 
corporations per se—although this possibility had been discussed.62 Any more fundamental 
critique of corporate capitalism was staved off then through the Allied governments’ realisation of 
their dependence on the major manufacturers for future war efforts. Instead the major US 
corporations were given key roles in rebuilding war-ravaged Europe, allowing them to demonstrate 
public service and ‘good neighbourliness’.63 Complaints from this point onwards were no longer 
fundamental challenges to the corporation but rather focused on the ‘corporate excess’ and ‘abuse’ 
of ‘bad apples’. Wormser’s demand that the Frankensteinian corporate monster was to be made to 
respect its maker64 seemed to have been satisfied, at least ostensibly. 
 
In legal scholarship the debate centred on the corporation’s objective, with CSR and ‘corporate 
citizenship’ advocates arguing that the corporation’s mandate is (or should be) wider than simple 
                                                 
57 H Glasbeek, ‘The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement – The latest in Maginot Lines to Save Capitalism’ 
11 Dalhousie Law Journal (1988) 363. 
58 R Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big 
Business (University of California Press, 2001); R Shamir, ‘The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded 
Morality’ 37 Economy and Society (2008) 1. 
59 Marchand (1998) 203ff. 
60 Bakan (2005) 19. 
61 J Coffee, ‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate 
Punishment’ 79 Michigan Law Review (1981) 386. 
62 JA Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really 
Said’ 109 Columbia Law Review (2009) 1094; Baars (2013). 
63 Marchand (1998) 361. 
64 M Wormser, Frankenstein Incorporated (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1931) 21. 
  10 
maximisation of shareholder return: that it should act for the benefit of other ‘stakeholders’ 
(workers, local communities, etc.), though doing so may also be, and indeed normally is, profitable. 
Although the profit/shareholder return objective had, in English law, just been introduced in 1844 
as the only lawful objective for the corporation, in the 1883 case of Hutton v West Cork Railway 
Co the court held that a company board could make a decision that at first sight went against 
shareholders’ interests. This would be lawful when the decision indirectly makes business sense: 
‘[t]he law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale 
except such as are required for the benefit of the company.’65 While CSR entails a calculation as 
to its value for the company, the ideological move this allows is to highlight the ‘generous’ 
provision of ‘cakes and ales’ for example to workers or the local community, while the corporate 
benefit of such provision—for example pacifying workers and thereby reducing risk of industrial 
action or other loss of productivity—remains hidden. As Marchand surmises, corporations create 
their soul, making us believe they are serving humanity, while in fact they serve capital66—a move 
that law permits and masks. 
 
The 1930s Harvard Law Review debate between Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd on the proper 
purpose of the corporation67 in this light, comes to appear moot, or indeed purely ideological—
rephrased according to the prevailing political climate. In the economically more secure US of the 
1950s, the economist Friedman in 1952 again floated the idea that any managerial concern with 
interests outside of shareholder interests reduces social wealth due to increased agency cost.68 
Friedman re-raised the ‘just business’ model dismissed in the 1920s, asking whether it should not 
rather be up to the state to set the rules on, e.g. wages, the environment, other ‘stakeholder’ issues, 
and that businessmen could not presume to know, and that it is not their task to decide what is best 
for society in general.69 The debate in the US and UK rests for now on the ‘enlightened shareholder 
model’, which allows attention to stakeholders to be seen as a generous gesture or progressive 
move.70 In particular, the currently popular notion of ‘shared value’ communicates the possibility 
of a win-win resolution for society and corporate capitalism, even if it is acknowledged to be 
important that the discussion  continue so as to offer a space for concerns over corporate activity 
to be aired, and discontent to be absorbed.71 This is an important achievement of/for the ‘CSR 
industry’ which can be ascribed to the dialectical development between popular concerns over 
corporate activity and the realisation that this presents a lucrative business opportunity as well as a 
vital value-creating legitimising process (regardless of whether one lives up to it).72 The 
responsibility for this can even be shifted to ‘consumers’: ‘[w]hether we like it or not, this [the 
emergence of the corporation] is what has happened. . . . The dangers are obvious. But history 
cannot usually be reversed. Until engineers and economic forces give us a way by which anyone 
can manufacture an automobile in his back yard we will continue to have organizations the size of 
General Motors or Ford—as long as people want Chevrolets or Fords.’73  
 
                                                 
65 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654, 673. 
66 Marchand (1998) 1-5. 
67 A Berle, ‘Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust’ 44 Harvard Law Review (1931) 1049; E Dodd, ‘For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?’ 45 Harvard Law Review  (1932) 1145; A Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers 
Are Trustees’ 45 Harvard Law Review (1932) 1365. See also A Sommer, ‘Whom should the corporation serve? The 
Berle-Dodd debate revisited sixty years later’ 16 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (1991) 33. 
68 Glasbeek (1988) 384. 
69 M Friedman & R Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago UP, 1962) 133-34, note 26. 
70 In the sense that (English) corporate boards are only legally obliged to consider the interests of stakeholders: S. 
172 Companies Act 2006. 
71 J Bakan, ‘The Invisible Hand of Law: Private Regulation and the Rule of Law’ 48 Cornell International Law 
Journal (2015) 279, 292. See further P Fleming & M Jones, The End of Corporate Social Responsibility (Sage, 
2013). 
72 Marchand (1998) 363. 
73 Berle (1957) 15. CSR is most popular among producers of consumer goods, for obvious reasons. 
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The more confrontational quest for ‘corporate accountability’ as part of the structured process of 
corporate ideology picked up in the economically abundant (in the West, at least) and politically 
activist 1960s, when companies came under more exacting public scrutiny.74 Ralph Nader in 1965 
published Unsafe At Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile in which 
he criticised the American automobile industry, which had found it economically rational to 
produce unsafe cars and pay out compensation to accident victims after lawsuits. This caused a 
scandal—and revealed a key tendency of corporate anomie.75 In addition, the anti-Vietnam war 
movement of the 1960s rallied against companies such as General Motors, General Dynamics and 
Chrysler, which were seen to be making large profits from the war, and against Dow Chemical, 
which produced both the napalm and Agent Orange used in Vietnam and almost two decades later 
the devastating chemical spill at Bhopal.76 During the 1970s crisis and decolonisation, the global 
class struggle intensified, and resulted in (amongst other things) the assertiveness in the face of 
increasing global corporate power of the G77 countries that resulted in the various New 
International Economic Order Resolutions.77 These growing accountability efforts gave impetus—
in what has been called the ‘private regulation revolution’78—to the development of the first series 
of soft law CSR instruments: the 1976 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the 2000 United Nations Global Compact, and the 2002 
Draft Norms on Multinational Enterprises on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,79 as well as a whole raft of corporate 
and NGO-produced documents. These instruments, while doing little to curb harmful corporate 
activity, especially in the Global South, were ideologically highly significant, as they fed into the 
development of a new expanded notion of global ‘corporate citizenship’ and of the legitimate role 
of corporations as partakers in neoliberal global governance and providers of socio-economic and 
civil rights80—as, for example, builders of schools and hospitals in the Global South.  
 
The triumphant ‘Gordon Gecko’ capitalism of the 1980s and 1990s –neoliberalism’s ‘golden 
age’—tripped up on the corporate scandals of Enron (2001) and WorldCom (2002).81 What is 
interesting is that these scandals led to a highly visible application of individual criminal liability.82 
Perhaps this—as well as the rise of the anti-globalisation movement starting in the late 1980s—
was the last push the CSR movement needed to start moving towards professionalisation, 
formalisation and eventually legalisation beyond the judicial endorsement of ‘cakes and ale’ 
spending. The result is that they maintain or increase their capacity to extract surplus value. The 
sizeable part of, or arguably all of, CSR which concerns business impact on the enjoyment of 
                                                 
74 Broad (2002) 6; Bakan (2005) 60; A Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global 
Economic Order (Oxford UP, 2011) 61ff. 
75 See generally R Nader, Unsafe at any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile (Grossman 
Publishers, 1965). 
76 Glasbeek (1988) 363. Dow also produced Agent Orange which would later become the subject of the Agent 
Orange ATCA suit, and was responsible for the disaster Bhopal. 
77 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA Res. A/RES/S-6/3201, 1 May 1994. 
78 R Shamir, ‘Capitalism, Governance and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility’ 6 Annual Review 
of Law and Social Sciences (2010) 531.  
79 Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, Annex to the Declaration of 11 June 1976 by Governments of OECD 
Countries on Investment and Multinational Enterprises, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/50024800.pdf  
(last visited 4 January 2006); UN Global Compact, available at https://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited 4 
January 2016); Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13, 15 August 2002, 15-21. 
80 Fleming (2013) 34 
81 S Karstedt & S Farrall ‘The Moral Economy of Everyday Crime: Markets, Consumers and Citizens’ 46 British 
Journal of Criminology (2006) 1011, 1013. 
82 Glasbeek (2010) 248-49. 
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human rights,83 was institutionalised through the work of UN Special Rapporteur on Business & 
Human Rights John Ruggie,84 contributing to CSR’s development into a lucrative industry in its 
own right, with a willing market of ‘fair trade’ importers and ‘socially responsible investors’, 
meeting ‘ethical consumers’ with a multitude of non-binding standards and guidelines, private and 
(semi-)public labelling and certification schemes and associated monitoring agencies. For 
producers of consumer products a visible CSR strategy is now an essential badge of corporate 
legitimacy. 
 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a ‘private regulation revolution’85 signalling the growing legitimacy of 
a governance function for corporations through the acceptance of their self-regulation by 
governments and (much of) civil society alike. Currently, however, some business representatives 
are joining ‘progressive’ domestic and international NGOs in responding to a more sceptical 
section of the public’s concern that CSR may amount only to window-dressing by calling for a 
‘legalised’ CSR consisting of binding rules and enforcement mechanisms. There was widespread 
disappointment when the United Nations Special Rapporteur’s final report did not propose a treaty 
clearly setting out corporations’ legal responsibilities.86 This has led to a ‘Global Movement for a 
Binding Treaty’ joined by 402 organisations and 745 individuals87 and, in July 2015, the start of 
negotiations on a binding CSR Treaty at the United Nations Human Rights Council. The ‘open-
ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights’, which was mandated ‘to elaborate an international legally 
binding instrument’88 published the draft report of its first session in July 2015.89  
 
Legalised CSR could include civil and criminal accountability in domestic law (mostly home-state 
law/legal systems as host state legal systems are often considered to be lacking), as well as specific 
legislation providing for liability for civil wrongs or crimes, including international crimes, 
committed extraterritorially. Some who call for a legalised CSR also advocate extending the 
jurisdiction of international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
corporations.90 This is no doubt stimulated by the growing popularity of international criminal law 
as well as the rediscovery of the Nuremberg Industrialists Trials in cause-lawyering practice. 
Corporate criminal liability was proposed but eventually rejected at the Rome Conference ICC 
Statute negotiations,91 but these developments indicate that today corporate criminal liability in 
international law is increasingly accepted.  
                                                 
83 Views differ over whether the scope of ‘business & human rights’ is broader or narrower than that of CSR. C 
López, ‘The ‘Ruggie process’: from legal obligations to corporate social responsibility?’, in S Deva & D Bilchitz 
(eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business (Cambridge UP, 2013) 58, 59. 
84 See, e.g., Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011; G Baars, 
‘“Reform or Revolution?” Polanyian v Marxian perspectives on the regulation of the economic’ 62 Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly (2011) 415, 425-27. 
85 Bakan (2015). 
86 Lopez (2013) 58. 
87 Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, available at http://www.treatymovement.com/statement (last visited 1 
November 2015). 
88 UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, 14 July 2014. 
89 Draft Report of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights, 10 July 2015, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Draftreport.aspx (last visited 1 November 
2015). 
90 See, e.g., McBarnet (2007) 9; D Stoitchkova, Towards Corporate Liability in International Criminal Law 
(Intersentia, 2010); N Bernaz ‘Including corporate criminal liability for international crimes in the business and 
human rights treaty necessary but insufficient’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, available at 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/including-corporate-criminal-liability-for-international-crimes-in-the-business-
and-human-rights-treaty-necessary-but-insufficient (last visited 1 November 2015). 
91 Baars (forthcoming) ch. 4. 
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In many jurisdictions including the UK, the laws necessary for corporate legal accountability 
already exist. British NGO Traidcraft in a recent report noted that the problem is that the political 
will to enforce these norms is lacking. The solution offered is a new legal framework—and at first 
glance this seems illogical considering the political will required to pass (and indeed enforce) such 
new laws. Traidcraft’s report also notes that directors of 69% of UK companies agree that 
companies should be accountable for harms caused abroad.92 Viewed in light of the dia/panlectical 
development of corporate ideology as described in this section, however, this makes sense. 
Following Bakan, who has argued that corporations participate in CSR processes in order to shape 
the narrative and ensure that any resulting private regulation regimes are optimally calibrated to 
business interests,93 we could argue that the engagement in advocating and negotiating legal 
changes is likewise an effort to ‘control the field’ and possibly even erode existing legal standards 
or change liability models or enforcement policies with similar effect.94  
 
Shamir has argued that a corporate conscience, or ‘soul’ had to be constructed—the corporation 
had to be ‘remoralised’, in order for self-regulation to be viewed as a legitimate mechanism.95 
Likewise, by extension, it is corporate right (corporate good citizenship), which creates corporate 
wrong/crime and, dialectically, vice versa: corporate accountability creates the ‘good 
corporation’.96 Corporate accountability thus equals ‘commodified morality’ or ‘moral’ behaviour 
with a clear economic benefit. The value of this dynamic is the legitimation of the corporation as 
the main surplus-value extracting mechanism—but also, as a ‘good corporate citizen’, as an actor 
in global governance with an as yet undefined mandate—as an enthusiastic participant in all 
important global fora, from Davos to Paris for COP21. In the next section I set out how CA cause 
lawyering inadvertently contributes to this. 
 
CA CAUSE LAWYERING 
 
In recent years the focus of those raising concerns about corporations has shifted largely to the 
Global South—possibly because a ‘kinder capitalism’ at home has limited, or concealed from 
scrutiny, ‘corporate excess’ in the metropole, and because western corporations have a global reach 
not seen since the BEI Co.97 CA cause lawyers have mostly worked on these, rather than western 
companies’ domestic activities also because of the internationalisation of NGO activities (and 
funding), and the seemingly useful legal tools in international law. Accountability solutions have 
mainly been sought in international human rights and criminal law applied domestically in home 
states (for extraterritorial activities) rather than domestic (host state) law per se. Particularly, the 
availability of ICL norms and the growth of the international human rights industry with a new 
focus on private actors, producing hard-hitting reports about business involvement in 
‘foreign’/international conflict, extraordinarily exploitative labour conditions and environmental 
destruction, and in general the increasing litigiousness of human rights/social justice practice has 
led ‘cause lawyers’ to attempt to hold corporations (and occasionally individuals) to account for 
                                                 
92 Traidcraft, ‘Two-thirds of British business leaders agree’, Press Release, 27 November 2015, available at 
http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/campaign-blog-entry/two-thirds-of-british-business-leaders-agree-with-us (last visited 23 
December 2015) 
93 Bakan (2015) 295. 
94 Which, in fact, it does. See below and Traidcraft (2015) 10-12. 
95 Shamir (2010) 536. 
96 See also Baars (2011) 415; Shamir (2008) 1. 
97 Also, some Chinese, Indian and Gulf corporations have a global reach—but CA focuses largely on western 
corporations. 
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violations in home state courts.98 In a parallel, and dialectically connected, development, broader 
publics have been mobilised, and have responded to, the emotive discourse around ‘corporate 
impunity’. The CA lawsuits appear to form the counterpoint to CSR, being aimed at ‘bad 
corporations’, making cause lawyers the designated (and thus far only) putative ‘enforcers’ of 
(legalised) CSR and corporate ICL. This puts them in a position of potentially, perhaps counter-
intuitively, creating value for the corporation and corporate capitalism. 
 
Cause lawyers and legal/human rights NGOs have found various ways of bringing claims in 
national courts ultimately based on violations of international human rights law and ICL.99 Best 
known of these are the compensation suits brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and other 
provisions of US law, which have been numerous and highly publicised.100 A small number of 
similar cases have been brought in Canada101 and in Europe.102 Where civil compensation claims 
for ICL violations are not possible, cause lawyers have found other strategic litigation methods 
around corporate involvement in conflict.103 Public interest lawyers in France have taken some 
more imaginative public law and contract law cases that are ultimately based on the allegation of 
an international crime.104  
 
The US has seen exponentially more CA cases than anywhere else in the world. A rush of cases 
started when Peter Weiss, chairman of the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), unearthed the 
long-forgotten ATS in the 1970s while searching for a legal means to hold to account those 
responsible for the My Lai massacre. He drew on his experience as one of the Morgenthau Boys 
investigating the German Industrialists preceding their prosecution at Nuremberg when applying 
the instrument to litigation against corporations allegedly involved in international crimes.105 In 
1996 CCR filed cases under the ATS against Unocal, accusing the US oil company106 of using 
slave labour in its plants in Burma, in collusion with the Burmese dictatorship.107 Similar cases at 
the time were brought against the major western oil and mining companies108 and against financiers 
                                                 
98 Sarat and Scheingold are credited with the term ‘cause-lawyers’ which they define as ‘lawyers who commit 
themselves and their legal skills to a vision of the good society’. A Sarat & S Scheingold (eds), Cause Lawyering 
(Oxford UP, 1998) 3. 
99 See, e.g., Business & Human Rights Legal Accountability Portal, available at http://business-
humanrights.org/en/corporate-legal-accountability (last visited 1 November 2015).  
100 This US instrument allows aliens (and Americans) to bring civil suits in US courts against parties who have, or 
are accused of having, committed a violation of international law. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350. 
101 Bil’in (Village Council) v Green Park and Green Mount, QCCS 2011 2 May 2011. See J Yap, ‘Corporate Civil 
Liability for War Crimes in Canadian Courts: Lessons from Bil’in (Village Council) v. Green Park International 
Ltd.’ 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2010) 631. 
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conferences and workshops on the issue, such as an effort by the European Centre for Constitutional and Human 
Rights, available at http://www.ecchr.eu/en/events/archive-2013.html (last visited 4 January 2016).  
103 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation 323 F. Supp. 2d 7 (EDNY 2005) (No. 04-400), a product liability 
case. 
104 L’Association France Palestine Solidarité (AFPS) v ALSTOM and VEOLIA TRANSPORT, Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de NANTERRE, March 2007. See the AFPS website, available at http://www.france-
palestine.org/article5863.html?var_recherche=veolia (last visited 4 January 2016); Global Witness, ‘Complaint 
accuses international timber company DLH of trading illegal timber and funding Liberian war’, Press Release, 12 
March 2014, available at https://www.globalwitness.org/archive/complaint-accuses-international-timber-company-
dlh-trading-illegal-timber-and-funding-0/ (last visited 4 January 2016). 
105 ‘Gespräch mit Peter Weiss’, in ECCHR TNU Konferenz Bericht (ECCHR, 2008) 22, 26; Baars (2013) 163-92. 
106 This section in particular draws on G Baars, ‘Corrie et al v Caterpillar: Litigating Corporate Complicity in Israeli 
Violations of International Law in the U.S. Courts’ 11 Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (2006) 97. 
107 Doe v Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal.1997); Roe v Unocal Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal 
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of, and suppliers to, oppressive regimes such as the South African apartheid government.109 A 
major series of cases that is subject to a complex settlement mechanism is the Holocaust 
Litigation—including against Ford for the use of forced labour.110 Cases were also filed in relation 
to corporate atrocities during colonialism,111 and against suppliers of the means to commit 
atrocities in war zones such as Vietnam and Palestine.112 
 
US Courts have found that corporations could be held directly responsible for the slave trade, 
genocide, war crimes, and other so-called ‘offences of universal concern’.113  They also accepted 
the principle of corporate liability for complicity in state acts of torture and summary execution, 
crimes against humanity, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, torture, violation of the right to 
life, liberty and security of person, prolonged arbitrary detention, and peaceful assembly.114  
 
Yet none of the ATS corporate cases—nor indeed, most of the cases brought elsewhere115—have 
resulted in a court win for the claimants. The claims relate to serious atrocities that have usually 
affected large numbers of people. Many of these cases have taken several years, and amicus briefs 
have been filed by other NGOs, churches, victim support groups, trade associations, legal scholars 
and governments. Courts have generally dismissed these cases on technical grounds, without 
consideration of the merits. In certain cases, in order to avoid, or settle, a mass of lawsuits against 
particular companies, states have set up mechanisms to channel compensation payments to 
individuals who have suffered losses as a result of companies’ actions or inactions. Some of these 
settlements have been challenged (unsuccessfully) as infringements of individual rights to 
redress.116 In other cases, such as in the Wiwa v Shell case, a settlement was reached directly by 
the (representatives of the) company and (representatives of) victims where thousands of victims 
are to receive nominal sums for the injury to their bodies, families, communities and environments, 
in return for abandoning the right to file future claims.117  
 
The 2013 US Supreme Court decision in Kiobel (on a claim brought on behalf of Ogoni Valley 
claimants against Royal Dutch Shell) changed the future of corporate ATS litigation.118 The Court 
of Appeal for the Second Circuit held that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts 
to hear claims filed under the ATS against corporations.119 Originally this point was to be the 
question in front of the Supreme Court for certiorari, however, the Court proprio motu changed 
this to the more general question of ‘whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize 
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MDL 1374, M21-89 (MBM) Opinion and Order, 25 September 2002. 
111 Herero 2001 Complaint: The Herero People’s Reparations Corporation and the Herero v Deutsche Bank AG et 
al. (First Amended Complaint, 18 September 2001), available at 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/US/Herero_Genocide_Case_Complaint_06-09-
2001.pdf (last visited 1 November 2015). 
112 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation 323 F. Supp. 2d 7 (EDNY 2005) (No. 04-400); Caterpillar; Baars 
(2006). 
113 In the sense that motions to strike out these cases brought by the defendant, for example, on the basis that (the 
specifically claimed provisions of) ICL did not apply to corporations (and thus that the plaintiff failed to state a 
claim, or the court lacked jurisdiction), were dismissed. 
114 Baars (2006) 121. 
115 Among the exceptions is Lubbe et al v Cape [2000] UKHL 41. 
116 See, e.g. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Lit., 302 F. Supp. 2d 89 (EDNY 2004). 
117 Centre for Constitutional Rights Wiwa docket, available at http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/wiwa-v.-
royal-dutch-petroleum (last visited 1 November 2015). 
118 Kiobel v. Shell (2010). The Kiobel case had been consolidated with the Wiwa case, but Kiobel et al. refused to 
settle. See CCR Wiwa docket. 
119 Kiobel v. Shell (2010) 48; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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a cause of action under the ATS’ thus allowing for a potentially far-reaching reformulation of ATS 
law while remaining vague on corporate liability. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the 
claim because of the ‘presumption against extraterritorial application of US jurisdictional 
statutes’.120 Subsequently, Cardona v Chiquita confirmed that no US corporation shall be held 
liable for conduct that took place outside the US.121 Yet, parts of the Cardona case continue in a 
federal district court in Florida.122 Cause lawyers, though ‘baffled’ by this latest string of cases, 
continue to litigate.123 We can see the dialectic at work here between legitimacy challenge and 
legitimacy reproduction, as these cases generated a significant amount of discovery and media 
coverage of corporate ‘crimes’ and ‘human rights abuses’—which in turn has spurred on corporate 
CSR development and the current call for legalised CSR/corporate ICL.  
 
LEGALISED CSR, CA CAUSE LAWYERING AND CORPORATE ICL 
PROBLEMATISED 
 
Just as it was argued in the 1940s that international human rights law would only ‘make sense’ if 
there is a way to hold individuals to account for violations, which became ICL, (global) corporate 
citizenship now only ‘makes sense’ when it is linked to the possibility to hold corporations to 
account in ICL. Subjection to corporate ICL validates the moralisation of M. Le Capital, and 
completes the process of CSR. Here I comment on the value, as part of corporate ideology, of CSR 
and corporate ICL, as generated through the work of cause lawyers as well as the proponents of 
legalised CSR. Although the CA efforts discussed here have many positive effects, not least the 
vastly increased public knowledge of corporate activities globally, I argue here that the strategies 
are part of the problem along four axes. I first look at compliance and class, then enforcement and 
imperialism. I then comment on cause lawyering as the reproduction of white privilege, before 
discussing the idea of a ‘market for responsibility’—which is where corporate ICL, CSR and cause 
lawyering potentially meet. I conclude on corporate power, legitimacy and the logic of law.  
 
Corporate crime, compliance and class  
 
A preliminary critique of the development of a ‘corporate ICL’ or Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrecht124 is 
that it excludes business actors from a general legal regime on the basis that they are sui generis 
and should thus have their own set of rules and enforcement policies. Additionally, the mere 
existence of a corporate crime rule inevitably removes the focus from individual business(wo)men 
and thus contributes to the reification of the corporation ‘emptied of individuals’—further 
facilitating the relative risk-free extraction of surplus value by the protected owners of the means 
of production. 
 
The main lesson from English law is that ‘corporate crime’, despite having been ‘on the books’ for 
decades, has not been used to prosecute corporations except in a small number of cases.125 On the 
                                                 
120 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). For a detailed discussion, see T Ferrando, ‘Law, 
Land and Territory in Global Production: A Critical Legal Chain Approach’, PhD Thesis, Sciences-Po (2015) 183-
235. 
121 Cardona, et al. v. Chiquita Brands International, et al., No. 12-14898 (11th Cir. 2014).  
122 Earth Rights International, ‘Supreme Court Allows U.S. Corporation to Finance Terrorism Without 
Accountability’, Press Release, 20 April 2015, available at http://www.earthrights.org/media/supreme-court-allows-
us-corporation-finance-terrorism-without-accountability (last visited 1 November 2015). 
123 Ferrando (2015). 
124 Literally, ‘economic international criminal law’: F Jeßberger, ‘Die I.G. Farben vor Gericht: Von den Ursprüngen 
eines “Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrechts”’ 19 Juristenzeitung (2009) 924. 
125 Whyte (ed.) (2008) 103. One such exceptional case is R v P&O Ferries (Dover) Ltd. [1991] 93 Cr App Rep 72. 
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domestic level, under neo-liberal regimes, rather than enforcement/punishment models, 
compliance models of corporate regulation are predominant.126 This is a function of corporate 
economic power and common class interest among business and legal/political elites. For this 
reason, there is likely only to be a semantic/ideological difference between existing voluntary and 
any new legally-binding norms as the latter are unlikely to be enforced with much rigour. 
Nevertheless, the mere existence of binding CSR/corporate ICL combined with a ‘compliance 
culture’ has the power to deflate the complaint of ‘corporate impunity’. Building, and invoking a 
compliance culture has two main effects described (in the domestic context) by Hawkins, Snider, 
Slapper and Pearce and Tombs in the ‘punishment model versus compliance school debate’ of the 
early 1990s.127 The first is that a corporation can shield itself from criminal liability by adopting 
programmes that provide technical compliance while not actually reducing the incidence of crime, 
and the so-called ‘due diligence defence’ could be invoked (by arguing managers had followed 
protocol) to ward off the risk of a finding of non-compliance. The second is the class-effect. 
 
The Afrimex case exemplifies how CSR (specifically, the adoption of a CSR policy or document) 
can function to insulate against a finding of violation of the OECD Norms.128 From this it is not 
difficult to imagine how CA court litigation may be decided in a similar way: companies show 
readiness to cooperate by emphasising their CSR policies, promise to adopt such policies, etc. This 
would prove pivotal as grounds for dismissing the claim. The UN Special Rapporteur on Business 
& Human Rights has defined the ‘responsibility to respect’ human rights as ‘in essence mean[ing,] 
to act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others’.129 Legalised CSR, which 
would likely be based on the Guiding Principles,130 would have the same effect as domestic 
corporate crime law. Due diligence works through the delegation of responsibility: each lower level 
employee has her/specific task list and has received training on compliance and has to sign off on 
compliance on tasks. This constitutes a ‘compliance system’ put in place by a senior manager (who 
has thus acted with due diligence) such that all aberrant results are the result of worker deviance.131 
This means that, even with corporate ICL, the most likely target of enforcement action (if any) is 
an individual low-ranking worker. As such, corporate responsibility/liability immunises the 
corporation itself and the directors and managers by shifting the blame to the workers. Compliance, 
especially, certified compliance, obviates corporate ‘command responsibility’.132 Here we see how 
capital works to protect itself (preserve value) seemingly in the face of mechanisms formulated to 
restrain it—amounting to ‘planned impunity’ for the corporate ‘structure of irresponsibility’. Thus 
it is no longer hard to see why British businesses would support the change to a due diligence, or 
‘failure to prevent’ liability model.133 
 
                                                 
126 G Gray, ‘The Regulation of Corporate Violations: Punishment, Compliance and the Blurring of Responsibility’, 
46 British Journal of Criminology (2006) 875, 887. 
127 On the punishment versus compliance models debate in criminal law generally, see the debate in the British 
Journal of Criminology between Pearce & Tombs (for punishment) and Hawkins (for the compliance model): F 
Pearce & S Tombs, ‘Ideology, Hegemony, and Empiricism: Compliance Theories of Regulation’ 30 British Jounral 
of Criminology (1990) 423; K Hawkins, ‘Compliance Strategy, Prosecution Policy and Aunt Sally: A Comment on 
Pearce and Tombs’ 30 British Journal of Criminology  (1990) 444; K Hawkins, ‘Enforcing Regulation: More of the 
Same from Pearce and Tombs’ 31 British Journal of Criminology (1991) 427; Gray (2006). 
128 Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 
Afrimex (UK) Ltd, available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/43750590.pdf (last visited 1 November 2015). 
129 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/12, 22 April 2009, 2. 
130 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011. 
131 Gray (2006) 875, 885. 
132 Certification and labelling schemes have a similar risk spreading/displacing rationale, see, e.g. G LeBaron and J 
Lister (2016).. 
133 Traidcraft (2015) 11-12: ‘Companies and directors would be able to call upon an adequate procedures defence to 
show that systems were in place to prevent harms.’ 
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Should legalised CSR or corporate ICL be enforced (beyond worker discipline) in an exceptional 
case, a financial penalty, or indeed any penalty that in a practical sense translates into a financial 
penalty (e.g. revoking the licence of a ‘blood diamond’ trader) will likely be accounted for by 
raising prices of products or services, cutting workers’ numbers, pay or conditions, or cutting 
expenditure on, say, measures to decrease the corporation’s negative effects on the environment.134 
As such punishment of the corporation is ‘socialised’ like any other risk, and may lead to the 
(collective) punishment of workers or external parties. Nader described in the 1970s how 
corporations can opt to pay a fine rather than employ technology to conform to safety or 
environmental regulation, if the latter is more costly.135 The key barrier to ‘effectiveness’ of 
sanctions in the sense normally used in criminal law is that a sanction would not change the rational 
basis for corporate decision-making, nor the individuals that made the relevant decisions, but the 
burden of compliance would affect the global working class.136 Corporate accountability here 
maintains and reproduces, with renewed legitimacy, the value-extracting rationale of the 
corporation and corporate capitalism. 
 
Enforcement and imperialism 
 
Forcese has described CSR as only being necessary because Third World countries, with 
‘underdeveloped legal systems’ are simply not able to write and enforce their own rules for 
corporate behaviour.137 Such countries in his view moreover may have ‘oppressive leaders’ making 
it even more necessary for developed country multinationals to seek (voluntarily) to set standards 
of good behaviour. Forcese suggests that CSR could be ‘administered’ by the international 
investment dispute resolution mechanisms, and/or by means of ‘smart sanctions’.138 Such language 
clearly echoes that of international law’s ‘civilising mission’, the export of ‘western’ law through 
IFIs, and ICL as a tool for intervention.139  
It is well known that the shift of most manufacturing and extraction industries to the Global South 
suits business due to lower costs (as a result of factors such as low wages and less stringent 
regulation or enforcement), and where the ‘crimes’ are not normally visible to us, and the victims 
are not known to western publics. With increased CA and public scrutiny, however, the risk of 
brand name damage as a result of a ‘scandal’ is real. It is exactly that brand value that enables a 
story to be spun that the scandal is the fault of an, at most, ‘badly chosen’ subcontractor rather than 
a result of supply chain power distribution and price squeeze.  
 
If we combine this with Forcese’s point (or attitude) above, we can see how corporate crime, 
warded off by the adoption of CSR compliance programmes, may create a distinction between 
‘civilised’ western-based multinational corporations on the one hand, and ‘cowboy’ host state 
companies on the other. Legalised CSR creates the possibility of selective enforcement against 
                                                 
134 A Simester, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart Publishing, 2010) 283. Keep in 
mind negative effects of fines on employees, creditors, and shareholders not implicated in wrongdoing. Other options 
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135 Nader (1965). 
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‘uncivilised’ corporations, to ‘level the playing field’,140 or eliminate that which ‘by its 
unpopularity poisons the pond in which we all must all fish’141 
 
An example of potentially ‘imperialist ICL’ is the OSI pillage litigation project, which has as its 
aim to intervene in the (mainly) African context of conflict resources. It could become the paragon 
of pro-business use of ICL, if it activates the proposals aimed at regulating the natural resource 
market in the conflict zones of Africa so as to enable prosecution of ‘rogue’ traders and miners 
connected to armed groups, thus enabling international corporations to mine and trade without the 
(costly) ‘blood diamond’ label.142 In sum, legalised CSR and Corporate ICL appear to be deployed 
particularly in order to facilitate continued value extraction particularly by metropolitan 
corporations, and thus the continued exploitation of mostly third world workers.  
 
 
Cause lawyering as the domestication of class struggle and reproduction of white privilege 
 
If we look at the matter from the point of view of those engaged in legal practice, we can see that 
in recent decades the promise of ICL has turned civil rights and criminal defence lawyers into 
lawyers seeking criminal prosecution. The romantic ideal of the civil rights movement, of ‘little 
people and landmark decisions’,143 of ‘speaking law to power’ has—in the context of ICL, turned 
lawyers to voicing traditionally statist claims for order and control through criminal law. Viewed 
through a Marxist theoretical lense, such cause lawyering might be seen as a form of resistance or 
class struggle, as a tactical ‘principled opportunism’144 that may be successful when it coincides 
with ‘judicial activism’.145 Although these attempts do amount to resistance, they are not 
emancipatory, and their (unintended) effect is rather, on one hand, to domesticate class struggle, 
and on the other, to actualise, legitimate, and strengthen the existing structures of power and, thus 
value extraction.146  
 
CA cause lawyering, based on extraterritorial claims and CSR legalised by means of a treaty, ‘lifts’ 
corporate behaviour out of local host state jurisdictions and potential local control (the locality of 
the harm and thus the affected persons) into a de facto Western capitalist realm of international 
normativity. In particular compensation claims and settlements create an exchange relationship 
                                                 
140 Traidcraft specifically refers to ‘cowboys’ who ‘act . . . as if they are above the law’ and ‘[i]n doing so . . . also 
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146 This is the conclusion of N Ziv & R Shamir, ‘State-Oriented and Community-Oriented Lawyering For A Cause: 
A Tale of Two Strategies’, in Sarat & Scheingold (eds) (2001) 287; M Sfard, ‘The Price of Internal Legal Opposition 
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where the ‘victim’ sells her right and the corporate offender calculates risk.147 We thus have a 
situation of ‘calculable law’ where value is created for the corporation and corporate capitalism 
through predictability or risk, as well as, and more so, through the ideological effect of the existence 
and operation of an accountability mechanism (even if partial or selective). 
 
The active agent in actualising the legal relationship between the individual ‘victim’ and the 
corporation is the cause-lawyer him/herself. While human rights claims are ‘claims for admittance 
to law’,148 the role of lawyers persuading people to bring cases in (western) foreign courts is in 
some way the equivalent of ‘spreading capitalist law’ (as part of the civilising or capitalising 
mission) as done by the corporate colonisers in the 19th century.149 In order for a claim to be valid 
and recognised, the human being must become a legal subject, she must articulate her needs, 
grievances and desires in legal vocabulary and in a western courtroom, through the mouth of 
(usually) a white man.150 She must ‘join the system’ in the same way that ‘decolonised’ peoples 
had to join the western state system and European international law. As a western lawyer I may 
think I am the enabler, the empowering medium in this equation, but in fact I am the opposite, as I 
produce (constitute) the ‘victim’151 and demand her surrender to my expertise, to become a rights-
entrepreneur.152 I, the white lawyer claim to speak for the oppressed, for justice, but I speak for 
capitalism, as its enforcer.153 Thus, inadvertently, such cause lawyers come to create value for the 
corporation/corporate capitalism—extracted from those on whom the suffering has been inflicted 
as well as (often) the natural environment, and barely ‘compensated,’ if at all. 
 
Settlements and selling rights: a market for responsibility 
 
Through the lens of the commodity form theory of law, compensation claims and settlements create 
an exchange relationship where the ‘victim’ sells her right and the corporate offender calculates 
the risk (price).154 The corporate decision maker gets to calculate the benefit of the violation (e.g. 
conflict diamonds are likely to be cheaper than ‘clean’ diamonds), the chance that those affected 
will speak out or find (or be found by) a human rights organisation (or UN appointed expert), the 
chance that they will commence litigation, the chance a court will keep the case going for a few 
years while the human rights NGO publicises the issue, the expected drop in sales and or share 
price, lawyers’ fees, in the process of determining whether, finally, to come to a settlement. The 
decision whether to cause the harm has a calculable price tag. For the ‘victim’, the need, desire to 
be free of injury becomes a ‘right’ which can be worth investing in through, for example, lawyers’ 
fees, time away from regular productive labour, in return for a calculable chance of success. What 
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is my price, for what sum will I relinquish all further claims? Victim and violator negotiate as 
formal legal equals. 
 
The question arises why business(wo)men would settle such cases at all if the record shows that 
the likelihood of the petitioners winning in court is next to nil.155 To analogise Sfard, who asks a 
similar question in the context of anti-occupation cause-lawyering in the Israeli courts, such 
settlements are beneficial to the company both directly as it allows them to look generous and 
recover from bad press, as well as to get claimants to sign statements relinquishing future claims, 
and indirectly it ‘supplies the oxygen’ of the system of capitalism itself, helping to render it 
sustainable and legitimate.156 
 
The essence of my critique here is that ATS and similar cases (including, potentially, legalised 
CSR and corporate liability in ICL with mainly financial penalties or penalties that can ultimately 
converted into a mere financial penalty157) turn the ‘international crime’ from a problem of 
international society into a problem between the individual victim (or group) and a powerful 
‘fictional’ economic entity in a powerful state—a quantifiable problem if it is ‘settled’ or receives 
a financial penalty.158 However, criminal fines could partially be allocated to victims, meaning that 
a successful criminal conviction, should such occur, would ‘yield’ the same result as a successful 
civil complaint. For example, in December 2011, Trafigura was convicted in a Dutch court of 
having concealed the dangerous nature of the waste aboard the Probo Koala ship. The company’s 
fine was decreased by the court to €1m because the company had set up a compensation fund for 
victims.159 This ‘solution’ serves to take the ‘victim’ out of the picture as an agent and merely 
positions her as a recipient of goodwill gestures from the corporation.160 Subsequent cases, filed in 
The Netherlands, France and the UK, seeking compensation for the harm to thousands of Ivory 
Coast citizens affected by toxic waste dumped from Trafigura’s ship, resulted in dismissals and 
out-of-court settlements.161 Corporate accountability commodifies the ‘right’ of the individual to 
be protected from crime (to remain free from harm); the individual is forced to sell by means of a 
material and (thus) power differential. I say forced, because the situation is comparable to ‘free’ 
labour and may be necessary for survival just as a third world employee cannot walk out on a 
situation where her rights are being abused. As such, the rights/crimes paradigm is liberalism’s 
essence: in global governance, it is each individual’s own responsibility to ‘valorize’ or to claim 
(negotiate, exchange) her right: claim your prize! Responsibility for violating a right (causing 
harm) only exists insofar as (and to the value of) the right (which is) claimed: accountability is 
achieved.  
 
By participating in the efforts to legalise CSR and to create the possibility for corporate ICL, 
corporations are not just turning a bad situation into a profitable one, but at the same time, they are 
                                                 
155 I adapt this point from Sfard (2009) 44: ‘Why are the authorities ready to compromise “in the shadow of the 
court” when reality shows that the Court rarely, if ever, decides in favour of the Palestinian petitioners?’ 
156 Ibid 45 (by analogy). On this notion see Barzilai (2007) 270: ‘Defying silence through litigation has also further 
legitimated the state, its main narratives, and state courts as markers of state and society relations.’ 
157 E.g. licensing penalties or ‘corporate death penalty’ which can be overcome through alternative licenses and the 
formation of new companies, at a cost. 
158 For the current ‘enforcers’ such as CCR and other private cause lawyers it is not financially feasible to file 
criminal cases (aside from whether criminal cases can be brought/initiated by private parties) because they normally 
also rely on settlement deals for their own funding. 
159 Trafigura, LJN: BU9237, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 23 December 2011, Case No. 23-003334-10.  
160 Shamir (2010) 531-53. 
161 ‘Trafigura lawsuits (re Côte d’Ivoire)’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, available at http://business-
humanrights.org/en/trafigura-lawsuits-re-côte-d’ivoire (last visited 4 January 2015); ‘Ivory Coast Toxic Waste 
Victims Still Await Payments’, VOANEWS, 12 November 2015, available at 
http://www.voanews.com/content/ivory-coast-toxic-waste-victims-still-await-payments/3056111.html (last visited 4 
January 2015). 
  22 
again owning the process, ‘controlling the field’. It is noteworthy that the breakdown of participants 
at the 4th UN Annual Forum on Business & Human Rights’ is as follows: 32% NGOs, 22% 
business, 12% government.162 The result is, the creation of corporate ideology of ‘canned 
morality’—the dispensing of commodified moral disapproval in order to conceal the transactions 
that lie below the surface of corporate accountability. The most important transaction is, paying off 
the victims that have been created and placed into a relation of exchange, which results in a return 
to a balanced account, and to innocence.  This transaction has then also concealed the structure, the 
broader effects on society and the natural environment, beyond that individual victim. This means 
‘canned morality’ is deployed to achieve precisely the opposite of what it is said to achieve, namely, 
liability is socialised, shifted to wider society and the natural environment. This move legitimises 
the corporation, all corporations, and corporate capitalism itself. This is allowed to occur, because, 
as Berle has suggested, accountability (canned morality applied to corporations) in the 
‘mainstream’ sense responds to a demand, and on a deeper level, to expectations of democracy. 
Generally the link between accountability and legitimacy is as old as the separation of powers, the 
rule of law, and democracy itself. Yet, ‘canned morality’ is as far away from democracy as we can 
get. 
 
Corporate power, legitimacy and law 
 
On the domestic level, Glasbeek has argued, corporate criminal responsibility was a ‘major 
response developed by law-makers trying to put their fingers in the dyke holding back the flood of 
illegitimacy threatening to drown the corporate form’.163 I noted above that corporate power has 
material and ideological elements. Corporate ICL, legalised CSR, actualised through claims by 
cause lawyers, constitute, and complete the corporation as a person. It also facilitates the spread of 
capitalist law, maintains global class differences, puts a price tag on rights, and absorbs 
emancipatory energy. Corporate liability constitutes the corporation not as an amoral calculator 
(pathological ‘monster’), but as a political citizen who occasionally errs.164 Criminal law is a 
regime of exception, where corporate transgressions would be constituted as exceptional rather 
than the normal, inevitable and a necessary consequence of the prevailing means of production.  
 
In a move that may have surprised some, the US Government on 21 December 2011 filed an amicus 
curiae brief in support of the claimants in Kiobel, arguing that it is for the federal courts exercising 
their ‘residual’ common law powers to determine whether and when corporate liability is 
appropriate. Taking into account the arguments raised in this essay, it is clear to see why the US 
government would wish to keep the corporate liability for international law violations option open. 
The US Government itself phrases its interest in the case thus: ‘[t]he United States has an interest 
in the proper application of the ATS because such actions can have implications for the Nation’s 
foreign and commercial relations and for the enforcement of international law.’165  
Having corporate criminal liability ‘on the books’ can be highly valuable for use against scapegoats 
or bad apples. Such liability is conceived as states’ residual sovereign right to control its (or punish 
others’) corporations. Augenstein argues (the majority CA-engaged civil society point) that CA 
must be seen instead as the obligation on home states to provide Third World victims with a right 
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of redress.166 However this vision still depends on global power elites to grant and fulfil that right—
which will only rarely be in their interest. Further, it depends on a vision of law as an unqualified 
good, operating autonomously from power/capital according to a logic of (social) justice, which, I 
hope to have shown, it does not.  
Finally, the UK government was the first in the world to publish its ‘Action Plan’ in fulfilment of 
its obligations to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the 
purpose of which it summarises as follows:  
 
• helping to protect and enhance a company’s reputation and brand value; 
• protecting and increasing the customer base, as consumers increasingly seek out companies 
with higher ethical standards;  
• helping companies attract and retain good staff, contributing to lower rates of staff turnover 
and higher productivity, and increasing employee motivation;  
• reducing risks to operational continuity resulting from conflict inside the company itself 
(strikes and other labour disputes), or with the local community or other parties (social 
licence to operate);  
• reducing the risk of litigation for human rights abuses;  
• appealing to institutional investors, including pension funds, who are increasingly taking 
ethical, including human rights, factors into account in their investment decisions;  
• helping companies to become a partner/investor of choice for other businesses or 
governments that are concerned to avoid human rights risks.167 
 
This summary is remarkable for at least three reasons. First, it seems wholly and brashly premised 
on the ‘business case’, addressing business as its main audience, signifying the primacy of capital. 
Second, ‘victims’ or those affected by abuses of British corporations abroad168 are entirely absent, 
and third, taken as a whole, this statement signifies the effectivity or ‘confidence’ of corporate 
capitalism in its legitimacy, such that only a modicum of ‘canned morality’ is required for 
acceptance. The effect of responsibilization here is therefore not a tighter connection between acts 
and consequences, or accountability (in its common understanding), but rather an ideological 
achievement, namely the development of intuitive comfort with the current logic of empathy 
redistribution.169 Corporate legitimacy has become calculably ‘cheap’—or rather—cheaply 
produced with a large profit margin. 
 
The dark side of ‘corporate accountability’ 
 
Although CA efforts may occasionally serve to restrain business involvement in conflict or 
improve the situation of persons affected by such involvement, added together they are only 
cosmetic changes on the surface of ongoing corporate-led human and environmental 
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exploitation.170 They are significant cosmetic changes in that they, in fact, function to sustain our 
illusion of the possibility, forever deferred, of systemic change through law. They are 
contextualised truth-telling functions as a tactic of mystification.171 Human rights law,, ICL, and 
so on, thus serve as a ‘ruse to perpetuate class rule’.172 While here I have focused on CA, by other 
means we reduce the room for legal manoeuvre in the states hosting our FDI and providing the 
workers that sow our garments and extract the resources we ‘dispossess’ from them.173 The effect 
of these efforts is, on the one hand, to domesticate class struggle, and on the other, to actualise, 
legitimate and thus strengthen the existing structures of power.174 All that is challenged and allowed 
to pass without sanction, is implicitly declared innocent. All that is not challenged by ‘rights-
entrepreneurs’ never even happened.175 
 
At the same time, an active human rights/cause lawyering scene willing to engage corporations in 
court creates the impression (illusion) that the system is democratic, that there is access to ‘justice’ 
and a remedy, that capitalism is rule-governed, with the broader implication being a ‘sociological 
and psychological process of transference of moral responsibility from the individual . . . to the 
justice system’.176 As such, cause lawyering is a profoundly liberal ‘in-power’ activity.177  
 
ICL can be seen as the ‘completion piece’ of international law, which served, along with other 
elements of ‘humanitarian’ international law, to legitimise the international law enterprise. By 
analogy, it can be said that CSR, corporate litigation, and also ‘corporate ICL’—together ‘corporate 
accountability’—completes the reification of the corporation commenced in the 18th century. As 
such, ‘corporate accountability’ forms the main part of what Klein has called, ‘the 50 year 
campaign for total corporate liberation’.178 By constituting the corporation as a responsible citizen, 
who ‘like everyone else’ risks criminal penalty for doing wrong, the global capitalist class have 
completed the corporation’s reification, thus allowing the corporation to exercise legitimate 
authority within ‘global governance’. For example, in an almost implausible tour de force, in 
September 2015 the Financial Times reported that Shell, BHP and GE are to advise governments 
on climate change.179 The re-moralisation of the corporation described in this essay at first sight 
appears to be the reverse of the project achieved by ‘calculable law’. However the corporation is 
infused with ‘canned morality’, not a commodity form ethic. Corporate accountability is still, 
‘corporate accountability’. ‘Marketised morality’,180 the ‘responsibilised’ corporation, has, 
moreover, dissolved the epistemological distinction between society and the market (more or less, 
the public and the private, or the economic and the political). In pluralist global governance 
conceptions, corporations, states and individuals can now interact as formal legal equals. 
‘Corporate rule’, or the multiplication of global capitalist class rule through corporations, is here, 
and legitimate. Thus, corporate capitalism can continue its unending search for surplus value. At 
the same time, the contradiction inherent in this situation, the cracks in the bond, is that such 
legally-constructed ‘irresponsibility’ (planned impunity) contributes to the anarchy of capitalism, 
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which will inevitably lead it to its collapse.181 This, together with the global 99 per cent’s growing 
consciousness—the active factor in the coming revolution—is the ‘seed of the new’. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS-BUILDING AND THE SEED OF THE NEW 
 
Human Rights Watch Director Kenneth Roth relates the origin of ‘corporate ICL’ as something 
that developed through systemic forces rather than (or, despite) his/civil society agency:  
 
Out of the blue, we came up with the concept of complicity. It is very interesting watching 
it evolve into a criminal concept, because that was not what we had in mind at all. . . . [I]t 
is a remote possibility that corporations will actually be charged . . . . Further, we do not 
get involved in tort litigation. . . . The way we enforce rights is, in a sense, by appealing to 
peoples’ [sic] moral sense of what is right and wrong and building up that popular sentiment 
as a source of pressure on the actor concerned, whether it is a government or a rebel force 
or, in this case, a corporation.182 
 
It would seem that the move Roth describes needs to be reversed. Recently, in particular in the 
context of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement, activism directed against corporate personhood has 
come to the fore.183 However, the point is not (just) to get rid of corporate personhood or to 
realise/remember that there are human individuals behind the corporate shield. The point is not 
then to seek to prosecute those individuals—the point is to realise that the property owning classes 
(the global capitalist class) are employing the law in this way, to enable exploitation, ‘shift’ or sell 
risk, and protect themselves as individuals, and create the ideology that means we put up with it 
all. As the foundational norm of law is the legal ownership of private property, however, law cannot 
but function in this way, and our resistance must turn against the concept of private property, 
against capitalism and against law: away from legal emancipation and toward human 
emancipation184 and the creation of alternative forms of organising, producing, and distributing.185 
 
The global capitalist class rule, to a significant degree, through and with the corporate form, which 
‘hides the essential brutality and indifference to the plight of others that characterises [corporate] 
profit-making activities’.186 Their ‘corporate rule’, is not only material, but also ideological187—
the corporation rules with a ‘combination of force and guile’.188 The two depend on, and mutually 
reinforce each other.  
 
If the corporation is indeed the motor of capitalism, corporate ‘excesses’ are the visible 
manifestations of capitalism’s ‘dark side’—or, conversely, the corporation is singled out as the 
author of capitalism’s ‘excesses’. Corporations, as capitalism’s visible persona, ‘capital 
personified’ become the pars pro toto taking the hit for the team, for capitalism as a whole. There 
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is value not only to the corporation itself, but to the system of capitalism more broadly in creating, 
repairing and maintaining the corporation’s reputation, its standing, as the ‘face’ of capitalism. I 
have examined the labour that goes into maintaining that value, and translating human and 
environmental damage into quantifiable, and exchangeable risk. While the corporation takes the 
hit for capitalism, the converse is that once the corporation is ‘fixed’, and rendered accountable, 
this immunises (temporarily) the broader structures of capitalism from critique. When our critique 
of capitalism and our activism mainly extend to creating avenues for or instances of corporate 
accountability, we inadvertently strengthen, rather than restrain, capitalism. Our labour then creates 
value for capitalism.  
 
Let us instead work towards the world we really want to live in. 
 
